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A very specific problem occurs at the heart of ontology: how can things exist externally, 
with others, while being made up of parts, and thus existing internally? Or, to phrase it 
a bit more poignantly, in Kantian terms: how can things have synthetic relations 
between the whole and the world while being constituted analytically, through relations 
between the whole and its parts? How can these two realms be part of one continuum 
of existence? No variety of materialism has been able to solve this problem. In its 
traditional form, determinism, either God or consciousness is needed to direct the 
connecting vector of necessity; and its later form, emergence, leaves a gap between the 
interacting parts and the emerged whole happily interacting with other wholes. Even in 
the nineteenth century, Darwin struggled with the idea that variation acted as the sole 
positive force in nature, “endlessly” adding “forms most beautiful,” 1  with natural 
selection doomed merely to act as a negative force, selecting out some of those variants 
as ugly misfits. Indeed, fitness in itself contributes nothing to the concept of variation, 
since it is not the environment that tells parts how to come together. Apparently, parts 
only interact with parts and wholes with wholes, and while materialist ontologies 
succeed very well in explaining the intensive parts stage and the environmental wholes 
stage, they completely fail to connect the two. The two physical sides of the equation 
are separated by a yawning metaphysical gap, impossible for them to bridge, at least 
physically. A brief reflection on the vertical nature of the term “emergence,” however, 
should make us realize that the flat, blind world of material interactions cannot exist 
without transcendence. Scientists and philosophers of science speak of emergence as if 
it is the reverse of classic top-down imposition, and it is, but merely in directionality, 
certainly not conceptually: it inhabits the same vertical axis, covers the same vertical 
distance, and thrives on the same dualisms. Without question, admitting to the 
metaphysical nature of emergence would deeply affect all notions of physicality, which 
is why all materialists shy away from it. Therefore, we should find a way to accept 
transcendence and, instead of making it part of external agency, make it part of things 
themselves. 
 To do so, we would first need to put enough mind into matter to allow the parts 
to see beyond their own horizon. We should come to understand their efforts to 
conform as an actual striving for a whole, which amounts not to a general teleology, like 
the abovementioned necessity, but rather to a local teleology, or what we might call a 
local transcendence. Then, inversely, we should allow wholes to connect to parts of 
other wholes, turning that local transcendence into a zone of attraction. My claim is 
	that only beauty makes this reversal possible. It makes the parts exceed the whole, 
rather than the whole exceeding the parts, as the doctrine of emergence prescribes. 
When you say someone has beautiful eyes, you do not expect the other to take out an 
eye and hand it over, as Baudrillard once joked. The parts of other people or things that 
we like—somebody’s red hair, the shining of gold, the curves of the hills, the light 
flickering on the river—we do not like as such, but as parts of a whole, as radiating 
from that whole.2 And at that point, the part has transcended its role as a part. The red 
hair might insulate the scalp from the cold, but our liking has no interest whatsoever in 
that physiological function. Natural selection will never be able to explain why redness 
came about in the way that emergence can, but emergence will never be able to explain 
why redness is liked—they pass each other like ships in the night. Beauty allows parts 
to be visible and available to other wholes without removing them from their 
relationship with neighboring parts. Philosophically speaking, this is unheard of: no 
other power is capable of jumping over the proverbial gap between the two realms. 
Beauty—and it is no accident that Darwin used the word—solves that impossible 
equation and manages to put the analytic and the synthetic in the same realm of 
existence, or at least to find a point where they intersect or align, or even pivot when we 
think of it as a reversal: a point that is necessarily ontological. Things cannot be without 
being beautiful; or, to put it somewhat more neutrally, things cannot be without 
making a claim on their environment, no matter what that claim is. Beauty is like the 
narrow middle of an hourglass, with all parts gathering into a single point on the 
convergent side and spilling out on the other, divergent side, as if radiating from that 
point. Our question in the next twenty or so pages should then be: How does beauty 
construct this intersection between the two states?  
 Traditionally, this point has been termed a “middle,” a middle that has taken on 
so many forms that it may be useful to roughly sketch its historical transformations 
before we enter into a more detailed discussion. A good place to start would be Apollo’s 
call for moderation, which later developed into Aristotle’s virtuous golden mean, and in 
between, Plato’s monopolar universe where beauty occupied the absolute center of 
everything. This concept raises some questions right away: does it mean that beauty is 
itself the middle—like a heart or an origin—or that it must exist between preexisting 
extremes that have not yet been mentioned? Plato was rather ambiguous on the matter, 
since in his philosophy beauty plays the role of the good yet is as often described by him 
in terms of the terrifying, such as a bolt of lightning that strikes from the sky. 
Apparently, his singular pole secretly leads a double existence. A few centuries after 
Plato, lightning became the model Longinus used to postulate his notion of the sublime 
in the Peri Hypsous: the claim of things not to a middle position but to the greatest and 
the highest. For more than a millennium, the universe of aesthetics has remained in 
this bipolar state, oscillating between beauty and the sublime, though occasionally other 
forms are admitted—the novel, the strange, the comic, the tragic—mostly in the form 
of subcategories. The first notion of beauty and the sublime being connected by a 
continuous scale of gradual transformations—as if by a slider, so to speak—may have 
come with the invention of the picturesque, famously described by Uvedale Price as “a 
station in between beauty and sublimity.” As is well known, Kant carefully follows the 
English aestheticians in their theories, while adding more positions to the slider and 
shifting beauty slightly toward the middle by introducing the pretty (Hübsch) on one 
extreme and the sublime on the other, with the magnificent and the terrifying 
(Schreckhaft-Erhabene) in between. Dilthey, the German neo-Kantian philosopher, in 
	turn, managed to add the ugly to the lineup as well, and was the first to call the system 
a spectrum. Following this hint on color, it was Max Dessoir who then constructed a 
diagram of aesthetics in the form of a color wheel, a spoked circle, finally bending the 
linear spectrum into a curved systemacy. At that point, it was not clear to Dessoir how 
the circle in fact reintroduced the concept of a middle on a new level: as a center, not as 
the midpoint on a line. At last, in the 1970s, the American process philosopher Charles 
Hartshorne, by then a septuagenarian (though with another thirty years ahead of him), 
mixed Dessoir’s model with Whitehead’s ideas on beauty to form a very precise biaxial 
model while placing beauty back at the center, creating a middle between two 
dimensions, between two sliders—one analytical, indexing the relations between parts, 
and the other synthetic, indexing relations between wholes. At that point, almost 2,500 
years had passed since Plato had expressed his ideas on beauty. 
 Describing the course of beauty through history, even in such a sketchy fashion, 
immediately challenges a facile concept of the middle, demanding a far more rigorous 
definition that will allow us to understand the variations and how these might have 
evolved from one another. In some of these historic phases, the term “middle” referred 
to moderation and mediation; sometimes it indicated a mean; and sometimes it was 
used in the sense of an equation. However, in this apparently confusing lineage we 
discern a clear increase in dimensionality, going from Plato’s universal center point to 
an ever-widening linear scale, then transforming into a circular surface defined by a 
center and a circumference. Naturally, during each of these phases, questions arise. For 
instance, looking at its linear phase, should we view the middle as a pivot between two 
ends of a scale? That would mean the middle was fixed and the extremes were variable. 
Or should we view the poles as fixed, with a sliding midpoint between them, which 
things could seek out through variation? The first would probably best be called an 
equation, the second a mediation. Strangely enough, the continuous blurring of 
concepts itself seems to have increased the dimensionality of the system. The single 
point transforms into a single line with two poles, and that single line into two lines 
(now with four poles), each stage defined by its own notion of a middle, be it a center, a 
form of mediation or an equation. We should not only be questioning what exactly 
constitutes a middle but also asking ourselves what it is whose middle we are speaking 
of, since throughout its history beauty has been surrounded by ever more diverse 
aesthetic values. Does this mean beauty is positioned in a world that consists of states 
that are not beautiful? Yes, in a way. And when such states are not beautiful, are they 
still part of that pivoting function, that ontological function that we have assigned to 
beauty? Yes, probably. And if so, does that mean those other states are related to beauty 
in a way in which they are not related to each other? Yes, it certainly would. 
 At the moment when we start to view beauty as fundamental to existence, we 
are able to understand the variable powers of the analytic and the synthetic as they 
merge in entities, spawning things that are not only beautiful but, just as often, ugly, 
magnificent, cute or funny, if not hilarious or ridiculous, or even quirky and quaint, 
cool, boring or weird, melodramatic and vulgar, or again totally common and ordinary, 
not forgetting of course horrific and terrifying, or utterly gruesome and disgusting—and 
many, many more things. Such ontological abundance means in the first place that all 
things are positive: all things act in the arena of presence, an arena deprived of any 
backstage area, basement, or curtains to hide behind. Things can be withdrawn, autistic 
or melancholic, but they are so in the light of day. In the second place, it means all 
positive things are equations of the analytic and the synthetic, both axes producing 
	positive values somewhere between zero and a maximum. And, since the synthetic deals 
with the configuration of presence—all wholes interacting with one another at a certain 
moment—it also means, in the third place, that such a snapshot fills the complete 
mosaic of beauty in all its variations. It forms a universe where every fragrant flower, 
every smile on a face, every bomb attack, every nightmare, every tumor and every silly 
joke seems to be part of a massive kaleidoscopic image in which the heaviest stone 
monument and the tiniest reflection, a flash of red hair and a plane crash, the most 
fragile dragonfly and the darkest forest all mosaically fit together at every instant, 
constantly aggregating into enormous multicolored crystals, which immediately collapse 
to be replaced with new generations; and this kaleidoscopic image is beyond what 
anyone of us would call order, or chaos for that matter, passing a threshold at which 
sheer contingency and pure perfection are wholly interchangeable. 
 Let us now take our little sketch and, step by step, add more detail. 
 
 
Spectrum and Circle 
 
The ancient, colossal statue of Apollo on his island of birth, Delos, carried in one hand 
his famous bow and in the other a second, much smaller statue of the Three Graces, 
mounted on a disk. Though a frequently used way of depicting Apollo’s dual nature in 
ancient Greece, this iconography is no longer commonly known, since most statues 
have not survived intact and only a handful of engravings on ancient coins and 
descriptions in ancient manuscripts remain. Apollo’s better-known attributes, the bow 
and the lyre, fulfilled similar functions, though more ambivalently, since in ancient 
Greece the two were clearly connected. For example, Heraclitus used the bow and the 
lyre to illustrate his celebrated doctrine on the harmony of opposites,3 later developed 
into concordia discors, the maxim of the Renaissance. Aside from the formal resemblance 
between bow and lyre, there is the conceptual one: the string of a bow can “sing 
sweetly,” as Homer wrote,4 and the music of the lyre can strike at our hearts with the 
sharpness of an arrow. The classical philologist Karl Kerényi argued that Apollo could 
not be adequately characterized by the customary loftiness ascribed to him but 
combined chthonic darkness and Olympian clarity in one divinity.5 In a similar vein, 
the classicist Marcel Detienne speaks of Apollo’s “profound ambivalence,” especially 
because he had more killings to his name than any other god.6 Apollo was capable of 
“striking from afar” (hekebolos) with his arrows as well as enchanting and persuading 
with his music or his tongue. In other words, Apollo’s dual nature is not so much a 
question of choice, of either/or, but of a combination, a doubling of the dimensions in 
which each of his actions takes place.  
 In light of this, we should be quick to distance ourselves from the depiction of 
Apollo as the tedious, teetotaling, proto-Christian anti-Dionysus that the early 
Nietzsche made of him in The Birth of Tragedy. The young philosopher crudely located 
Dionysus at one end of the spectrum and Apollo on the other, as if the first were 
interested only in excess and the second merely in harmony. Apollo’s temple in Delphi 
was in fact shared with the Dionysus cult. In winter the temple was used to dedicate 
services to Dionysus, but the rest of the year the priestess—the Pythia—was in regular 
but frenzied communication with Apollo through epiphanies that were at least as 
ecstatic as those of the god of wine and spirits. Certainly, Apollo’s maxim—mēden ágan 
(“nothing in excess”), inscribed above the entrance to the temple in Delphi—is a call for 
	moderation, but we have to keep in mind that moderation is always one of excess. 
Apollo’s call is not one for abstinence: he does not propose to counter excess with 
asceticism or passivity; that would lead absolutely nowhere. We should understand that 
excess and moderation are not of the same order and that we cannot just stop halfway 
toward excess. We cannot simply interrupt ourselves, nor can we divide ourselves in 
two, into a rational, moderating mind and a body thirsty for excess, since the mind 
would quickly concede during any ecstatic act. No, it would be much better to imagine 
excess and measure as two forces coming from different directions. And those two 
forces need to be mediated: they can only be resolved through one act. In this case, a 
single act does not subsist in doing one thing until the point of exhaustion. The act 
needs to follow a curved trajectory: to start in one direction and come to a close in 
another. A single act—that is, an act of beauty—does two things simultaneously. First 
it aims for excess, then it aims for moderation, or, to use the metaphor of Apollo’s bow, 
it shoots the arrow upward while aiming forward. With this model, we are shifting the 
notion of mediation toward that of mathematical equation: between the horizontal axis 
of measure and the vertical axis of excess, Apollo draws a curved function, equating the 
influence of both, starting with more verticality and ending with horizontality.  
 Doing something well, or, as Aristotle would say, doing something virtuously, 
then becomes a form of navigation, in which we do not move in one direction but steer 
between multiple directions. This, of course, we recognize from Plato’s analogy of the 
charioteer in the Phaedrus, where the soul is represented by a chariot pulled by two 
winged horses, one black and the other white. Plato’s analogies—the cave, the ladder of 
love, the charioteer—are not just metaphors, as often indicated, but closer to 
mathematical functions, and it is no accident that in many translations they are clarified 
with concise diagrams. In fact, it would not be wholly off the mark to call Plato the first 
analytic philosopher, since those analogies could easily be written out in mathematical 
symbols. (His notion of truth was deeply influenced by Pythagorean equations.) 
Anyway, the brilliance of the analogy of the charioteer lies in the fact that the vector of 
an act can be separated into two forces, or, more precisely, two sets of variables, since 
each horse can exert anything between minimum and maximum force. And since the 
horses are winged, the chariot can go up, down, left or right. It is quite clear from 
Plato’s descriptions in the Phaedrus that the steering cannot be reduced to the mere 
imposing of one’s will on both horses—if that were the case, the soul would not need 
the horses to strive. On the contrary, Plato describes a myriad of behaviors: zigzagging 
through the sky, falling back to earth, and steering one’s way up to the sphere of 
immortality to become part of the ever-recurring cycles of the heavenly bodies. The 
soul, as Plato sees it, is not the charioteer steering the body as a homunculus but the 
single movement between two directions. Slightly earlier, when writing the Symposium, 
he used the term metaxu for this in-between, a term which becomes especially 
important in the dialogue between Diotima—“a woman from Mantinea”—and 
Socrates, as she teaches him about the nature of love as it relates to beauty.  
  “Love is of beautiful things,” 7  she says, which means: not yet possessing 
beautiful things but being in a state between not having and having beauty, a state that 
cannot be described as a static betweenness but as a being-under-way, a state of striving 
and navigating. In this sense, all acts are acts of love because they strive for beauty, and 
such acts coordinate themselves between two feelings: one of sheer happiness8 and one 
of pure fear, a fear of falling in which one moves in the opposite direction along the 
vertical axis of transcendence toward doom and failure. This double movement of love 
	is taken up again in the Phaedrus after the analogy of the charioteer, when he arrives at 
the moment of possession, falling in love with a beautiful boy whose face strikes him 
like “a bolt of lightning”;9 it is a love that makes the soul “begin to grow wings.”10 And, 
as often in Plato, it presents a dual argument that floats between stillness—we should 
bear in mind that the charioteer actually stands still in his chariot—and movement, 
between wisdom and ignorance, but here especially between overpowering and 
empowering. We are “captured by beauty” while “a fear comes over us,”11 a power that 
comforts us as much as it terrifies us, and one that he as often associates with a bolt of 
lightning as with the brilliance of the sun.  
 In Plato, we are not only introduced to this vast cosmic system of heavenly 
verticality and earthly horizontality but also to this confusion of beauty-as-the-highest 
and beauty-as-the-middle. And the confusion sometimes tends to take hold of the 
pages and spread like a stain. For example, Plato is adamant about the ontological 
nature of beauty when he states that beauty is literally “seeing reality;”12 then again, he 
is convinced that the realm of beauty, a “place beyond heaven,” is “a place without 
colors, without forms, and without solidity.”13 Obviously, such a contradiction at the 
core of his philosophy poses a colossal problem. How can we see what is invisible? Let 
us first note that the confusion was not merely his own: it preceded him in different 
forms, and it persisted all the way through Hegel’s “sinnliche Idee”14 and Paul Klee’s 
“art renders the invisible visible,” to cite just two examples. Also, we should realize that 
the problem is more of a geometrical, dimensional nature than a conceptual or 
philosophical one. Without a doubt, Plato put all the elements in place: the vertical, the 
horizontal, linearity, circularity, the middle, the circumference—though the whole idea 
remains a tangle almost too discouraging to unravel. As stated, it would take thinkers a 
couple of thousand years to see that what looked like a pole was actually a line, and that 
what looked like a line was actually an axis, and what looked like one axis with two 
poles was actually two axes, and that those two axes were equated by a circle, and that 
the circle was a single line that had one pole in the middle. After a few millenia of 
aesthetic development traced beauty back in the center, we can conclude that Plato had 
been right all along. 
 The notion of beauty-as-the-highest is one we find in many variations, of 
course, especially under the Neoplatonic philosophers, such as Pseudo-Dionysius, 
Plotinus and Saint Augustine, who without exception were theologians. Nietzsche 
derisively called Christianity “Platonism for the people,” 15  which might not be 
completely accurate, except for the implicit argument that Christians took advantage of 
Plato’s confusion. The image of God embodies fear as much as it does love, and this 
confusion goes back much further than the Christian interpretation of Platonism. For 
instance, Zeus was associated with lightning, thunder and weather in general,16 i.e., 
with what we would call the sublime, while his son Apollo was associated with the sun 
and the radiance of the beautiful. (I would not be the first to state that Christianity 
copied that model from the ancient Greeks. In fact, very early depictions of Jesus show 
him as beardless as Apollo, and with his head surrounded by the same radiant halo.) 
But let us not dwell too long on the mythological origins of Western theology. Since 
our interest goes out to beauty and navigation, we should focus on its dimensional 
structure and try to unravel the difference between beauty-as-the-highest and beauty-
as-the-middle. Longinus, who in the first century A.D. wrote Peri Hypsous—literally 
meaning “On the High” though generally translated as On the Sublime—makes 
extensive use of the thunder-and-lightning model to describe the epiphanic character of 
	sublimity. Throughout the treatise, it is clear that Longinus aligns the sublime with 
greatness—a word he uses over and over—as well as with the power of lightning that 
strikes from above, moving the subject “out of himself” (ekstasis) and overpowering him 
with an “irresistible force.” Let us disregard the fact that Longinus’ argument lies in the 
realm of rhetoric, or art in general, since it makes no difference for the positioning of 
the sublime on the vertical axis whether we encounter it in words, in imagery, through 
standing in front of actual mountains, or through sitting at home contemplating the 
endlessness of the universe—the diversity of these examples is telling enough. Beauty, 
sublimity, ugliness, nobility—without exception, these aesthetic values are to be found 
in the realm of the natural as well as the artificial; therefore, no theory relying on the 
formal properties of these realms will be able to sufficiently define such values. What is 
remarkable is that what at first seem to be mere metaphors are in fact exact 
phenomenological descriptions of aesthetic feelings; and what is even more remarkable 
is that their precision does not lead to a phenomenology but to an ontological 
machinery of a perplexing geometrical exactitude. How else would it possible for things 
to be called “high” or “great”? 
 After Longinus was translated into French by Boileau in 1674, his book quickly 
landed in the hands of the English aestheticians, and it was they who developed the 
sublime and prepared it for the German idealists, who turned the high into the deep, 
first as Kant’s Abgrund, then as Schelling’s Ungrund. John Dennis, Joseph Addison, the 
Earl of Shaftesbury, Edmund Burke: over a period of a hundred years, English aesthetic 
philosophers took the sublime and refined it with notions such as that of enthusiastic 
terror, which they distinguished from common terror (a fear mixed with a feeling of 
admiration), and placed it in the realm of the unlimited, the majestic, and the 
stupendous, all direct descendants of Plato’s black horse, the horse of divine madness, 
or as the ancient Greeks called it, enthousiasmos. But what in Plato was still an 
overlapping of two forms of beauty, the highest and the middle, now became more 
clearly distinguished: beauty was a smooth world of what Francis Hutcheson famously 
called “uniformity amidst variety,”17 while the sublime was a world of the unlimited and 
the unbound, of either enormous size (like mountains), indefinite size (like weather and 
storms), or infinite size (like endlessness itself). Even without elaborating on the issue, 
it is immediately clear how the variety of terminology led to Kant’s “Analytic of the 
Sublime,” in which the sublime is analyzed as formlessness18 or as the gap in judgment, 
be it in its mathematical state of the infinite or its dynamical state of pure forces 
without form. For our purposes, the younger Kant is of more use, since he drew, in 
particular, from the wealth of Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas 
of the Beautiful and the Sublime of 1757 and started to change its organization from a 
bipolar to a linear system. 
 Though in his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764) 
Kant is not as imaginative as Burke in introducing new aesthetic values, he is highly 
original at conceiving linkages between them. While in Burke’s Enquiry all aesthetic 
examples are defined as subcategories of the two polar categories, we encounter a more 
complex systematization in Observations. As in Burke, we are told that mountains are 
sublime, as are Egyptian pyramids, and, in general, men more than women, but also 
black hair and all things related to the night, while small things are beautiful, and of 
course women more than men, as well as blond hair and delicate things bathing in 
daylight. The two colors of Plato’s horses return even in human hair, defining the same 
distinction of ecstatic Rührung and calming Reiz.19 As said, the increased systemacy of 
	the Observations is of more interest to us, especially since it is based on what Kant calls 
Mischung, admixture. We should bear in mind that “admixture” is a concept closely 
related to Plato’s metaxu, since it requires a continuum between two different states. 
With the term Mischung, Kant is able to articulate the existence of objects that are, for 
instance, less sublime and more beautiful, such as the splendid, das Prächtige. That 
notion of the splendid is then no longer a subcategory of the sublime, like Burke’s 
magnificence, but a genuine category born of the parentage of mixture. Because of its 
direct relation to power and overpowering, Kant found the splendid in palatial and 
ecclesiastical buildings. Homonyms for splendid are “superb,” “great,” “grand,” 
“magnificent,” all referring unambiguously to size. Largeness is not merely a question of 
size; it necessarily follows the play of forces, and therefore structure is more visible than, 
say, a smooth skin. For example, Rome’s St. Peter’s basilica, Kant argues, has both 
sublime aspects, because of the colossal order of “its frame, which is large and simple,”20 
and elements of beauty, such as the “gold and the mosaic work,” and in their mixture 
we apprehend it as splendid. This is a discovery of great significance, though mostly 
overlooked by Kant himself, since it means that an object that has aspects of two 
aesthetic categories can be experienced in one feeling rather than through swinging 
back and forth between two. Such an insight could have led him away from 
subjectivism, because it emphasizes the singularity of the aesthetic object. 
 At the far end of the sublime, Kant posits the Schreckhaft-Erhabene, the 
terrifying sublime, followed by the noble (das Edle), and then by the splendid. Each of 
these moves further away from a pure sublime, mixing in more beauty, until we finally 
arrive at beauty itself, first in a more mature version, which still seems to contain some 
remnants of the sublime, and then in a juvenescent version he calls hübsch, pretty, a 
derivation of beauty that “speaks less to the heart.” 21  As often, though, next to 
admixtures we find Burkean subcategories of the sublime and of beauty, such as tragedy 
and comedy. Since in the Observations Kant is not trying to build a solid philosophical 
system, as he is in the three Critiques, it is rather difficult for the reader to distinguish 
between genuine aesthetic feelings and variants of such feelings. Gradually, however, 
we see the beginnings of a linear system emerging, not Plato’s polar or Burke’s bipolar 
model but a continuous line with at one end things that are smooth, vary gradually and 
are mostly smaller in size and at the other end things that are rough, vary more through 
angularity and sudden shifts and are larger. This resembles almost exactly the system 
used by Uvedale Price to position his notion of the picturesque as “a station between 
beauty and sublimity.”22 In 1796’s On the Picturesque, he maps out exactly what the 
picturesque consists of: 
 
Another essential quality of beauty is gradual variation; that is … where the 
lines do not vary in a sudden and broken manner, and where there is no sudden 
protuberance: it requires but little reflection to perceive, that the exclusion of all 
but flowing lines cannot promote variety; and that sudden protuberances, and 
lines that cross each other in a sudden and broken manner, are among the most 
fruitful causes of intricacy. I am therefore persuaded, that the two opposite 
qualities of roughness, and of sudden variation, joined to that of irregularity, are 
the most efficient causes of the picturesque.23 
  
 Reading this carefully, we notice that Price describes the two not just as a pole 
of roughness and an opposing one of smoothness but also as two types of variation. 
	Here, we get the first hint in aesthetic theory that things are combinations (equations, 
mixtures, metaxu) of two sliding scales, one of smooth and one of rough variation, one 
of graduality and one of suddenness. What first seemed to be a mere pole of beauty 
opposed to one of the sublime slowly develops into an axis of beauty, sliding between 
unity and plurality, and an axis of the sublime, sliding between maximum depth, i.e., 
the infinite, and minimum depth, such as prettiness. This would mean that less smooth 
does not automatically equate to more rough but that both smoothness and roughness 
consist of their own sliding scales, each influencing every object independently. We find 
another hint at such a theory in Hogarth’s renowned Analysis of Beauty, which is 
generally taken as an argument for mere smoothness, since it stipulates the importance 
of the smooth, S-shaped serpentine line, which he calls the line of beauty. This is only 
partially correct, since in Hogarth’s analysis these lines of smoothness and gradualism 
do not connect up smoothly: 
 
there is one type of waving line that truly deserves the name of the line of 
beauty, only one precise serpentine line that I call the line of grace … lines that 
should be judiciously mixed and combined with one another … into [a joint 
sensation of bulk and motion].24 
 
 Later in the book, when discussing contemporary women’s hairdos, he calls the 
combination of smooth curves and criss-crossing wantonness “picturesque,”25 almost 
forty years before Uvedale Price used the term. And in his paintings and engravings he 
uses the same term for dancing groups, gatherings at dinner tables, and crowds in the 
street. In his introduction to the book, Ronald Paulson very aptly describes Hogarth’s 
aesthetics as “an aesthetics of the crowd.”26 The title The Analysis of Beauty suggests the 
desire to update the notion of beauty, though, not to introduce a new species, and to 
move away from the all-too-idealized, all-out smoothness of Giorgione or Titian, in 
which smooth lines do connect up smoothly. Hogarth tried to locate a new middle in 
the combination of roughness—what he calls “bulk”—and smoothness—“the line of 
grace.” In Price and Hogarth, we encounter as yet only a suggestion of a biaxiality of 
the aesthetic system; we must wait almost 200 years to see it elaborated to its full extent 
in the realm of philosophy.  
 In that discipline, it was first Wilhelm Dilthey, the German neo-Kantian 
philosopher, who expanded Kant’s selection of values, fitting in more of the terms that 
Burke had introduced. What makes his contribution particularly valuable is the 
introduction of the term “spectrum” in his discussion of the notion of mixtures. In 
1887’s Poetry and Experience, he writes: 
 
To this mixture of the sublime, the tragic, and evil, ugliness can be added. Here 
we reach the limits of aesthetic impression. We represented the beautiful as the 
midpoint of a spectrum of poetic moods.27 
 
Of course, we have just leapfrogged over the span of a full century, so by the 
time we encounter Dilthey, many details have been added to what we can almost start 
calling the aesthetic diagram. Aside from the term “mixture” reintroduced after Kant, 
we see that Dilthey has managed to finally position ugliness in the lineup; until then, 
ugliness had merely been a subcategory of beauty, and a negative one at that. The works 
of Victor Hugo, Dickens or Shakespeare would be unimaginable without their ugly 
	characters, Dilthey argues; the narrative would simply not move forward. And he 
encounters the same positivity of the ugly in African masks and in Dante. To clarify, he 
is not making a judgment; neither judgment nor criticality plays an ontological role in 
aesthetics. Following the same line of argument, Charles Hartshorne states very clearly 
that there is no negativity in aesthetics, not even a zero, only positivity:28 there is no way 
we cannot experience; we might qualify our experience as “negative,” but that is still a 
qualification and not a non-qualification. What is more, Dilthey speaks of a spectrum 
of values, which will prove to be important when we start to involve the color wheel as a 
system incorporating not only gradualism but also contrast and suddenness. And, he 
makes a far bigger effort than his predecessors to restore the notion of beauty-as-the-
middle, repositioning it from one side of the spectrum to the center: 
 
On both ends of the spectrum, whose middle is formed by the ideally beautiful, 
there arises an admixture of displeasure, and from a dissolution of the latter, a 
peculiar agreeableness. In one case, the feeling of something immeasurably great 
in the meaning of an object must be overcome; in the other case, the feeling of 
something trifling.29  
 
He is onto something extraordinary here. After hundreds of years of 
aestheticians extending the range of the sublime, adding various types of terror, even of 
horror (in the case of Ann Radcliffe),30 he extends the range of beauty, not just with 
prettiness but many other aesthetic values, at least enough to shift beauty toward the 
middle. Though much of Kant remains in his analysis, Dilthey succeeds in including 
many of the values that Burke listed in his Enquiry, such as the ugly, the tragic and the 
comic, as Kant had failed to do. As with his predecessors, it is often difficult to 
precisely distinguish between categories and subcategories, but shifting back and forth, 
we can retrieve the following spectral sequence from Poetry and Experience: moving 
from one end to the other, we encounter the sublime, the tragic, the ugly, the beautiful, 
the sentimental, the comical, the graceful and the petite. At this point it is irrelevant 
whether or not we agree with this list. We merely need to acknowledge that what we 
called “minimum depth” a few paragraphs ago has now been extended by multiple 
values, with petite at the far end, in clear reference to the smallest possible size of 
things. “Trifling” also denotes a certain shallowness or superficiality, directly 
positioning it on an axis of depth, even though it indicates a lack of it. On the other 
hand, a spectrum of depths does not fit with Hutcheson’s smooth spectrum that went 
from unity to variety, with everything in between and beauty in the middle. Evidently, 
organizing aesthetic values in a linear system presents serious limitations. For instance, 
we can see how the sublime might differ only one notch from the tragic, but to have the 
ugly removed likewise by a single notch from beauty seems improbable. The more 
existing aesthetic values we try to incorporate, the less a single dimension succeeds in 
explaining how middles and extremes are to be related. If everything is mixture, what is 
at the ends? Surely, if there are ends, they would be excluded from the mixture. But if 
we succeeded in removing the ends, where would that leave the middle? That said, the 
enormous contribution of Dilthey’s spectrum lies in the inclusion of the ugly as a 
positive value and (re-)positioning beauty in the middle of the system. 
 Finally, in his Aesthetics and the Theory of Art of 1906, the German aesthetics 
theorist Max Dessoir turns the spectrum into a circle. A two-dimensional circle is 
capable of organizing values in a way the one-dimensional line of a spectrum cannot; it 
	can include adjacent gradations, such as that between the sublime and tragic, as well as 
contrasting oppositions, such as that between beauty and ugliness. In Dessoir’s book it 
is depicted in a very small diagram, no more than an inch in diameter, with six aesthetic 
categories aligned along the perimeter. The spectral line born out of Burke’s bipolar 
system now becomes an aesthetic circle that runs from sublime to beautiful, to cute 
(Niedlich)31 to comic, to ugly, and finally to tragic, which links up again with the 
sublime (see fig. 1). Without going too far with our analysis, we should make a few 
remarks on Dessoir’s terminology. In the first place, “cute” is a far better term than 
Kant’s “pretty” or Dilthey’s “petite.” “Pretty” is not shallow enough, and “petite” not 
small enough, to occupy the position most contrary to the sublime. For instance, babies 
are cute, and for good reason: cuteness is the form beauty takes in situations where 
there is a complete lack of power, so as to restore that power. Cuteness merges the 
shallow and the likable into an overwhelming sweetness—again, a category 
acknowledged by Burke32—which we recognize from our soda drinks and our obsession 
with sugar, as well as from the way lovers constantly address one another as “Sugar,” 
“Sweetie” or “Honey.” Cuteness plays a far more important role in our contemporary 
aesthetic than it did in Dessoir’s time, when there was no Hello Kitty, no My Little 
Pony, no Mini or Swatch.  
 
Tragic
Pretty
Comic
Beautiful
Ugly
Sublime
Tragisch
Niedlich
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Schön
Häßlich
Erhaben
  
 
Fig. 1. The Aesthetic Spectrum as published by Max Dessoir. On the left is the original 
German version from his 1906 Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft; on the right, the 
diagram as published in the 1970 English edition Aesthetics and Theory of Art (which 
mistranslates Niedlich as “pretty” instead of “cute”).  
 
 On the other hand, when we compare Dessoir’s circle to Dilthey’s spectrum, 
some terms are missing, and some of the positionings are rather unconvincing. For 
instance, it is difficult to imagine the sublime and the beautiful as being adjacent to one 
another in the same way beauty and the cute are, nor akin in the way of the sublime and 
the tragic, whose link was thoroughly established by Schiller and Schelling. Nor can we 
imagine the sublime and the beautiful being as close as the ugly and the comic, though 
Dessoir’s positioning of the ugly is again an enormous improvement on Dilthey’s. The 
comic and the ugly have an intimate relationship that we recognize from a long history, 
starting with dwarves, hunchbacks and jesters in the European courts, hilarious and 
pitiful Falstaffs in the theaters, and the dumme August and stumbling clowns in the 
circus. Similarly, from the eighteenth century onwards, we witnessed the explosion of 
	caricature, the ultimate science of elasticity—elongating noses, thickening lips, bulging 
eyes, widening heads, shrinking chins, and so on—which culminates in our own 
fabulous Mr. Bean, who is blessed with the most elastic face ever. As with Dilthey, we 
are for the moment only concentrating on the organizational geometry of the aesthetic 
system, and therefore we can overlook the misplacing of certain categories and the 
resulting sequential order. Crucial at this point is that Dessoir closes the linear sequence 
into a circle by merging the ends, creating a continuity of aesthetic values.  
 It is no accident that the circular system looks like a color wheel, as Dessoir 
himself remarks: 
 
… the whole fabric of aesthetic feelings can take on various tints…33 
 
Probably he chose six tints 34  for his aesthetic circle because it resembled 
Goethe’s color wheel of 1809 (see fig. 2 on the left), who, differently from Newton, 
based his color scheme on gradations as much as on opposites (or what Goethe called 
polarity). The English edition of Dessoir’s book adds spokes to the circular diagram, 
making it look even more like a wheel. Dessoir, who explicitly mentions Dilthey’s 
Poetry and Experience as the main source of his ideas, admirably managed to join the 
two ends of the spectrum, like the ouroboros biting its own tail. Above all, he writes, 
his goal was “to arrange the primary forms in such a way that the transition from each 
to the two adjacent ones occurs with conceptual ease, and those opposed in content are 
opposite in position.”35  Again, it is an order that explains the two dimensions of 
existence in a way a straight spectral band cannot. We can read the circle rotationally, 
following the gradual change from beautiful to cute to comic to ugly, and we can read 
beauty as opposite to ugliness as well, since they are positioned directly across the center 
of the circle from each other. It coincides exactly with the color wheel, which we can 
read as a system that contains smooth, gradual variations, such as that between red and 
orange, as well as rough, complementary contrasts, such as that between red and green. 
 In the history of color theory, the circular diagram actually preceded the linear 
spectrum, since the latter is based on wavelengths in the electromagnetic realm that 
were not established until the nineteenth century. When we look back at the color 
wheel with the knowledge of electromagnetic waves, we should ask ourselves how it is 
possible that ultraviolet can occupy a position directly adjacent to infrared when the two 
are at opposite ends of the linear spectrum. The position of violet between blue and red 
is completely logical when we look at the color wheel, but not when we look at the 
linear band of colors of the electromagnetic spectrum.36 It is quite a mystery, and in the 
world of color theory there is no real answer to be found; it appears that color is a system 
in itself, independent of electromagnetic waves, and therefore necessarily takes on the 
shape of a closed circle. How else can the color corresponding to a wavelength of 380 
nm (violet) fit next to the one corresponding to that of 720 nm (red)? What is 
discontinuous in the linear spectrum is continuous on the color wheel, solving all 
relations between colors as gradations, but without sacrificing the structuring 
oppositions. Circular color diagrams date back to medieval times, and though Aron 
Sigfrid Forsius made one in 1611 that contained much more detail, none of these 
exhibit the simplicity of Newton’s color circle published in his 1704 Opticks (see fig. 2, 
right). It is not certain that Newton ever laid eyes on the diagram of Forsius, or how he 
came to bend the linear spectrum created by prism and rainbow alike into a circle. One 
reason why Newton created his circular diagram could be that he conceived it as a disk. 
	With all the colors—and in his mind there were seven, which deeply disturbed Goethe, 
who preferred six—painted in the right sizes, the disk, when spun around at high 
speed, would change from multicolored to white. (There we are: white is the mixture of 
all mixtures, the middle of all mediation.) This was to prove his theory that white light 
could be broken into spectral colors by a prism. However, it doesn’t explain the colors’ 
order. Probably the final answer was given by Newton himself, who admitted that 
between red and blue we would see indigo, not just the violet we find in the prismatic 
range.37 None of these explanations is very satisfying. The perplexing fact remains that 
all colors can be arranged on a wheel, a solution far more convincing than the linear 
electromagnetic spectrum: it radically turns color into a world of its own, an 
autonomous system constructed by internal relations of gradation and opposition.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The two most famous color wheels: on the left, Goethe’s 1809 version with six colors 
(containing the term Schön in the red area); on the right, Newton’s version from Opticks (1704). 
 
 The fact that we cannot explain something with concepts that are external to it 
means that, philosophically speaking, we have reached bedrock. A system that only 
consists of smooth, gradual variations would need an underlying, second system to 
adequately explain contrasts. And a system that consists only of fractures or rough 
variations would need a secondary system to explain kinship. It is mind-boggling to 
discover an ontological machinery based on continuity explaining the discontinuous, 
since it acknowledges polarity without having to rely on negativity. Nothing precedes 
color; no other systems are a priori to it: there is only the parallelism of other value 
systems, such as aesthetics, taste, smell and feeling, but no deeper ontology. What we 
generally view as mere peripheral, surface phenomena are actually structured in 
themselves, and therefore absolutely fundamental. Facts are made of value systems, or, 
as Whitehead put it: “… an actual fact is a fact of aesthetic experience.”38 This not only 
means that color follows the structure of being but, more shockingly, the reverse as 
well, potentially creating a massive leak between aesthetics and ontology. In a nutshell: 
objects are constructed in the same system that we use to have feelings for those objects. 
And so subjectivism is the first to leave the scene, followed by negation, and then 
materialism—matter is simply what matters.  
	 
 
Compass and Wheel 
 
Before we move to the final stage in the development of a biaxial systemacy, in the form 
of Charles Hartshorne’s Diagram of Aesthetic Values, we should take a brief look at 
the ideas on beauty of his primary influence, the Anglo-American philosopher Alfred 
North Whitehead. Like Hartshorne, Whitehead developed his ideas on beauty quite 
late in life, and not really until two of his last books, Adventures of Ideas (1933) and 
Modes of Thought (1938), published when he was in his seventies.  
 As I have discussed on earlier occasions,39 to define the nature of the two axes 
properly it is vital to understand Whitehead’s argument, especially considering the 
history of aesthetic theories, which, by the way, both he and Hartshorne felt confident 
enough to omit. Beauty—“the teleology of the universe,” as Whitehead phrased it40—
consists of two dimensions, one of “mutual adaptation,” the other of “patterned 
contrasts,” 41  or, in the words of Price, Hogarth and Burke, one dimension of 
smoothness and one of roughness. The axis of mutual adaptation (note the phrase’s 
subtle evolutionary and environmental ring) indexes the necessity of harmonizing, that 
is, wholes harmonizing with other wholes; in short, the synthetic axis of smoothness, or 
extensity. The fact that it consists of an axis means that on the one end we find things 
that harmonize extremely, that are ultraunified, which Whitehead calls “minor beauty” 
or “the absence of a painful clash.”42 Meanwhile, on the other end, we find things that 
don’t succeed in harmonizing, that is, things that are ultraplurified, what we call ugly. It 
is important to understand that the other term, contrast, is different from mere 
diversity, though. Things do not simply vary, they break away from each other. We see 
fractures emerging, sudden shifts and cuts (being literally analytic). Such contrasts and 
fractures often lead to layering and stratification with parts or groups of parts hiding 
behind one another, in what we often denote with “depth” or “profundity.” Therefore, 
the effect of contrast is often expressed by magnitude, which is why we find the 
previously discussed greatness of the sublime on this axis, as well as the smallness of the 
cute at its opposite end. 
 This system allows every thing, every “occasion,” every gesture to exist as a 
combination of smoothness and roughness, or in Whitehead’s terms, massiveness and 
intensity. Here, massiveness refers to an index of coordination by gradual variation, and 
intensity to an index of the degree to which that coordinated whole allows its parts to 
be available to others. In themselves, there is nothing new in these remarks; we find 
them as readily in Uvedale Price or Edmund Burke. What is remarkable, however, is 
the fact that Whitehead does not put these on a single sliding scale, with massive, 
compact wholes on one end and loose, fractured ones on the other. Whitehead’s 
doctrine is not just another take on Hutcheson’s unity amidst variety. The parameters 
of massiveness and of intensity each have a uniform side and a diverse side; both are 
driven by variation, but each by a different type: one smooth, the other rough; one 
operating on adaptation, the other on contrast.43 Though he does not refer to prior 
aesthetic theories, which would have been helpful, nor visualize his system in the form 
of a diagram, which would have been even more helpful, he clearly views the system as 
a two-dimensional one, organized along two axes, each with minimum and maximum 
values at the ends. 
	 Eventually, by combining Whitehead’s ideas on beauty with Dessoir’s little 
diagram, Hartshorne took the final steps in his development of a diagram of aesthetics, 
an effort which can be traced over many years, beginning in the 1970s with Creative 
Synthesis and Philosophic Method, where he published the first version of what he then 
called the Dessoir-Davis Circle. As a diagram, it was strongly influenced by Dessoir’s 
example from the beginning of the century, but the philosophy behind it owes far more 
to Whitehead. The version Hartshorne published in Creative Synthesis was a still-crude 
version of what he later, in 1987’s Wisdom as Moderation, finalized as the “Diagram of 
Aesthetic Values” (see fig. 3). In these diagrams, Hartshorne made two essential 
adjustments to Dessoir’s model, based on his readings of Whitehead: first, he 
repositioned beauty, and second, he added the superb, 44  the neat and the 
commonplace.45  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Diagram of Aesthetic Values (from: Charles Hartshorne, Wisdom as Moderation, 1987). 
 
 
 We should look at the repositioning of beauty first. It is quite clear that 
Whitehead’s notion of beauty lies at the core of his process philosophy: things are only 
beautiful in their striving for beauty. Beauty is, above all, a teleological concept, since, 
as Whitehead himself said, “adaptation implies an end,”46 and while things strive to 
harmonize they can only do so by freeing their parts, allowing them to break away. 
Beauty, then, is not simply a state but a vector, similar to Apollo’s arrow at the 
beginning of our discussion: each extensive act carries the need for intensity. Beauty 
inherently lies at the center of all this, as literally the target of every arrow, merging 
	target with trajectory. It lies where the two axes intersect, and not where Dessoir 
located it, at the rim. Even though Hartshorne was deeply influenced by Whitehead, to 
actually position beauty at the center of a circle with two axes was a masterstroke.47 
Thinking back to Plato’s white and black horses, we can see how Hartshorne’s model 
recasts the two forces as one striving for harmonization and the other for intensity. In 
Hartshorne’s diagram, beauty is again firmly positioned in the middle, but the middle 
of a far more complex system that reconfigures Plato’s monopolar, solar notion of 
beauty: “Beauty, in the most natural sense of the word, is the center, the double mean in 
both dimensions.”48 Beauty is not a simple, singular middle, but a middle trying to find 
another middle. 
 Along with his Platonic repositioning of beauty, Hartshorne added three new 
categories to Dessoir’s six, one of which he called “superb”—an idea we have already 
come across in Burke, in the form of magnificence, as well as in Kant, in the form of 
the Prächtige—and the other two “neat” and “commonplace.” The latter two are crucial 
additions: “neat,” though not a wholly satisfactory term, has connotations of monotony 
and boredom, while the commonplace corresponds to the normal or ordinary. With 
these, Hartshorne completely rearranges—repairs—the top half of Dessoir’s model. It 
can be no accident that these final categories were added in the twentieth century, the 
age of the media and the masses. Before then, the concept of the commonplace was 
known mostly in the form of vulgarity, which at best ended up being associated with 
the comic. But in its modernist form, it points to a blandness and a complete lack of 
qualities that is truly original. The neat, better known in the form of boredom, is far 
older and, as ennui, was even considered an art by the likes of Charles Baudelaire and 
Beau Brummell (who famously turned to his valet to ask which of two lakes he admired 
most.)49 Andy Warhol, the twentieth-century champion, if not saint, of boredom, made 
an eight-hour movie of the Empire State Building filmed in real time over a single 
night, appropriately titled Empire. He also loved to spend his holidays in Sweden, 
because, as he said, “in a place like that you can get so bored.”50 The closest category 
from ancient history would probably be the decadence of the late Roman Empire as 
described in Petronius’s Satyricon. With Hartshorne’s circle, the aesthetic spectrum 
seems to transform into a continent, a planet even, where the spectral lines of Kant, 
Dilthey and Dessoir form partial routes or complete equators. Hartshorne’s addition of 
the neat and the commonplace created a “north passage” at the top of the diagram 
similar to sixteenth-century attempts to expand shipping routes from Europe. 
 With his Diagram of Aesthetic Values, we can finally go full circle: reading 
clockwise, we encounter the sublime, the superb, the neat, the commonplace, the 
pretty, the comic, the ugly, the tragic and finally the sublime again. We should make a 
few adjustments, however. The superb is not as convincing as magnificence; the latter 
has more historical roots that go deeper and wider than superb, which dates back no 
further than the Renaissance. The neat should be substituted with the boring; again, its 
history is just too powerful, as we saw above, to say nothing of the celebrated 
elaborations of Martin Heidegger and Erich Fromm on the topic. The other 
replacement should be for the pretty, which we should exchange for the cute, which is 
conceptually stronger, and more correct opposite the sublime. Hartshorne seems 
unaware of Dilthey’s categorization of “trifling” coinciding with his own qualification of 
the pretty as bordering on the “too trivial,” and how Kant’s notion of the Hübsch 
preceded these. Oddly enough, Hartshorne never discusses any historical precedents or 
developments of the circle or its terminology. Therefore, the final circular lineup will 
	be: sublime, magnificent, boring, commonplace, cute, comic, ugly, tragic, and back to 
sublime. Although Hartshorne never bothered to draw the actual axes and only 
indicated the four poles in additional captions, we should include these in the revised 
diagram as well: a horizontal axis spanning from sublime on the left to cute on the 
right, and a vertical axis from ugly at the bottom to boring at the top (see fig. 4). 
Together they create the structure of a wheel or compass. It moves from the silent 
scream of the sublime to the exalted cry of the magnificent to the yawning mouth of 
boredom to the flat expression of the commonplace to the gentle smile of the cute to 
the outright laughter of the comic to the disgusted “ick” of the ugly, on to the weeping 
of the tragic, and back to the noiseless gasp of the sublime. We could play these facial 
expressions as an animation and we wouldn’t be able to discern any jumps or cuts. And 
it all works because beauty has been taken out of the sequence: the relations between all 
these aesthetic values are wholly different than those between them and beauty. We 
have eight aesthetic categories that occur on the outer rim of aesthetics, connected by 
spokes of gradually decreasing value to the hub of beauty, which is in fact a ninth one, 
or the first, whichever one prefers. That the system in its final form looks like a 
compass reflects both meanings of the word: a limited, finite structure such as a planet 
as well as an instrument for navigating that planet. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. The Compass of Beauty (adapted from Hartshorne’s diagram to include the biaxial 
system and a revised terminology). 
 
	 
 Translated back into the color wheel, this would give us the standard hues at the 
outer edge of the circle, with more brightness mixed into each color until it becomes 
pure white light in the middle. (Plato’s solar model of beauty was probably no accident.) 
Now we should also be able to find a place for every nameable aesthetic value on this 
circle, since feelings can vary in all directions, both rotationally and radially. We should 
have no problem finding positions that are located neither at the center or at the rim 
but occupy the as-yet-undefined area in between—the quirky, the quaint, the weird, the 
cool, the elegant, the vulgar, the melodramatic, the horrific, the gruesome, etc.—but 
that is an argument we will save for later. 
 
* * * 
 
When we fast-forward through the history of beauty, the first peculiarity that attracts 
our attention is that it started with Plato, who hated art, then developed through 
aesthetics, with indispensable contributions by artists, and then moved away from art 
again. For example, I think the Large Hadron Collider and the Saturn V rocket are 
more sublime than paintings of mountains, far more abstract and far more violent. And 
football stadiums are more magnificent than Kant’s St. Peter’s, and when a wave 
performed by 80,000 spectators moves over the stands, we are overpowered and swept 
away—to use Longinus’s terms—by sheer awe. General Tommy Franks also called his 
invasion of Baghdad a strategy of “shock and awe,” leaving no misunderstanding about 
where we should locate the sublime in our own age. I think there is more terror and 
horror in the daily imagery of suicide bombings than in Alien, Friday the 13th and The 
Texas Chainsaw Massacre put together. There is more of the commonplace and the 
ordinary in reality television, in the endless soap operas and in Facebook posts than in 
the street life of Baudelaire’s Paris. And if you type “beauty” into your search engine, 
you won’t find the work of contemporary artists but a zillion websites related to the 
cosmetics industry. And who is not cute today (though no society goes as far as the 
Japanese with their kawaii)? It seems that art is playing an ever-smaller role—and the 
media an ever-larger one—in the development of the diagram, and especially in how it 
organizes the distribution of objects. Was Plato right again? Permit me to leave that as 
an open question.  
 In any case, what becomes evident in the developments over the last fifty years is 
that they show the ontological nature of the diagram more prominently. It is also clear 
from these developments that we seem to be living in an era that is expanding the 
diagram at high speed while moving away from its middle with equal speed. We live in 
an age of design: not just the design of objects but of events, concepts and issues, of 
organizations and procedures, even of our own lives. One’s own life has become a 
project. The number of things is growing exponentially, and growing exponentially 
further away from beauty. If the diagram concerns all things, not just works of art, we 
should realize that it concerns them through beauty. This is the true power of 
Hartshorne’s Diagram of Aesthetic Values: only beauty can relate the vertical axis to the 
horizontal one. The two axes are not independent; they don’t form a mere coordinate 
system. If they were independent, the diagram would not be a circle but a square, and 
we could simply combine one extreme with the other, which goes against the whole 
notion of a middle. A square is not an equation; a circle is. We should keep in mind 
that even the sublime in Hartshorne’s diagram is plotted halfway against the vertical 
	axis of harmony and coordination. The fact that the influence of each axis always needs 
to be mediated makes beauty more than simply the middle of a circular world: it 
reverses the roles and makes the periphery a derivative of the middle. Both areas are 
circles: a white one in the middle and a multicolored one at the outskirts.  
 I don’t have to stress the fact that Hartshorne’s diagram shares many traits with 
the cruciform structure of Heidegger’s fourfold; the similarities are quite obvious. They 
share the same purpose: to divide Being according to two axes, one spanning the space 
between the unified (boredom) and the plurified (ugly), the other between the deep 
(sublime) and the shallow (cute).51 Of course, Heidegger does not define the fourfold 
by the axes but by the four quadrants, which he identifies as sky, mortals, gods and 
earth. This is telling in a way, because by defining the quadrants he makes it impossible 
to view the axes as productive. The fourfold remains a static architectural system, a 
Geviert, and though he sometimes speculates about one quadrant mirroring the other, 
and even about a “round dance,”52 it never attains the status of an ontological machine 
equipped with dynamic sliders. Viewing the intersection of the axes as a hub, and 
identifying that with beauty, causes the compass to take on the character of a wheel 
more than a cross. Heidegger’s Being always takes an unmoving, neutral position, 
humming in the background, whereas Whitehead’s and Hartshorne’s beauty thrusts 
things forward into presence. From the perspective of the Diagram of Aesthetic Values, 
the four quadrants can never be primary because they are parented by two axes. All 
activity lies with the axes, and they are bound to one another, limiting each other’s 
influence to a circular field of existence—what I earlier called the arena of presence. 
Heidegger strongly resented the notion of being as presence53 and attempted to extend 
the phenomenal world to absence (e.g., the negativity of nothingness and the 
invisibility of Zuhandenheit), to things happening without passing through 
consciousness. Certainly, no one would deny that things exist before they enter human 
consciousness, but that doesn’t mean reality condemns things to roam around in 
darkness. On the contrary, it means things can claim light and consciousness in their own 
right: nonhuman thought and unseen light. Things think before we think them (how 
else could we understand things?), they are visible before we see them (how else would 
we see them?), and they affect their environment before we feel them (how else would 
we find them beautiful?). Again, the way the existence of things is constructed cannot 
be fundamentally different from the structure of our feelings; this is what the Diagram 
of Aesthetic Values teaches us.54  
 When we take a careful look at the diagram, we can better see how process and 
product not only are combined but are combined symmetrically only in the middle and 
asymmetrically everywhere else (though still equated). When we go back again to stand 
in front of St. Peter’s with our faces upturned and our mouths open in admiration, it is 
the magnificent structure that overwhelms us. If we move from the basilica’s position of 
magnificence vertically down on Hartshorne’s map, we encounter figures such as 
Macbeth and Michael Jackson, obliterated by the tragic events they have instigated. At 
the position of magnificence, it is the massive structure that overwhelms us, and at the 
position of the tragic, it is the enormity of the events overwhelming their subjects: 
exactly the same magnitude in very different dimensions. This is why we recognize the 
top area of the diagram—the realm of magnificence, boredom and the commonplace—
as the general territory of structures, or what Mikel Dufrenne called the spatial arts, and 
the bottom area—the realm of the tragic, the ugly and the comic—as the zone of 
events, or again in terms of aesthetics, the temporal arts.55 That doesn’t mean buildings 
	“are” boring; it means that when time is stopped they become boring, as in Warhol’s 
Empire, where the Empire State Building is boring because you are trapped in your 
seat. (If you are walking in New York, the Empire State Building is anything but 
boring.) Or think of the funny example of Heidegger stuck in a provincial railway 
station after missing a train.56 Forced to wait for four hours, he started walking up and 
down the platform like a pendulum, hopelessly trying to restore time, like a panther in a 
cage. Inversely, the asymmetry of space and time means that the positivity of ugliness 
functions very well in plays, literature and movies but not in architecture. While in a 
gangster movie a character like Al Capone boosts the speed of events by bashing in 
heads with a baseball bat, an ugly building does not have the same positive effect on 
urban space. That doesn’t mean a building can’t be ugly; obviously it can, and a play can 
as easily be boring—that is not my point. In the specific case of a boring play, I think it 
exposes too much architecture, for example when it lacks development and has 
cardboard characters that move through the drama without changing. Similarly, a 
building is ugly when it tries to be funny or becomes too theatrical, since the chances 
are that we will encounter it more than once, killing all possible humor, or that we will 
experience it from more than one angle, destroying every illusion.  
 On the product side, things have to be looked at in terms of how they relate to 
time; from the process side, they have to be looked at in terms of how they relate to 
space. Beauty is not organized by going from product to product nor from process to 
process, but from process to product and from product to process and back again. Ours 
is a jerking, jolting universe. If aesthetics operated within one dimension, a single line 
of variations and gradations would suffice. If it consisted merely of spatial encounters, 
things would simply shape each other from the outside and the synthetic axis would do 
all the necessary work. And if it solely consisted of events meeting one another, all 
would be pure development; the internal growth of things would never lead to them 
being born into the world. In the Diagram of Aesthetic Values, these two lines are 
bound to one another as axes, with both rather than one or the other exerting their 
influence on the final product. When things are formed, they are internally driven by a 
force occupying the analytic axis of intensity, while they simultaneously orient 
themselves in and adapt to an external world whose powers are expressed along the 
synthetic axis of the extensive, i.e., present themselves as forms. Things present 
themselves in one realm, but they cannot be explained through one dimension, only 
through the conflation of two dimensions.  
 Stand in front of a 400-year-old oak tree. Its structure—the branchings, the 
bifurcations, the random curvature—all this is pure process, pure time and growth. But 
does it present itself to us as time? Do we experience it as time? No, we experience it as 
sheer magnificence. All that was time is presented to us as beauty, and all that is beauty 
we experience in time, yes, but the second stretch of time is wholly discontinuous with 
the first. In this sense, beauty is purely Platonic, atemporal stoppage. 
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